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Abstract 
Governments are widely viewed by academics and practitioners (and society more generally) 
as the key societal actors who are capable of compelling businesses to practice corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). Arguably, such government involvement could be seen as a 
technocratic device for encouraging ethical business behaviour. In this paper, we offer a more 
politicised interpretation of government engagement with CSR where “CSR” is not a desired 
form of business conduct but an element of discourse that governments can deploy in 
structuring their relationships with other social actors. We build our argument through a 
historical analysis of government CSR discourse in the Russian Federation. Laclau and 
Mouffe’s (1985) social theory of hegemony underpins our research. We find that “CSR” in 
the Russian government’s discourse served to legitimise its power over large businesses. 
Using this case, we contribute to wider academic debates by providing fresh empirical 
evidence that allows the development of critical evaluation tools in relation to governments’ 
engagement with “CSR”. We find that governments are capable of hijacking CSR for their 
own self-interested gain. We close the paper by reflecting on the merit of exploring the case 
of the Russian Federation. As a “non-core”, non-western exemplar, it provides a useful 
“mirror” with which to reflect on the more widely used test-bed of western industrial 
democracies when scrutinising CSR. Based on our findings, we invite other scholars to adopt 
a more critical, politicised stance when researching the role of governments in relation to 
CSR in other parts of the world. 
Key words: Corporate Social Responsibility, government, Russian Federation, hegemony, 
empty signifier.  
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Introduction 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), or the idea that business organisations should go 
beyond a certain financial performance and legal compliance to contribute to social welfare 
and environmental protection through their operations (Crane, Matten and Spence, 2013; 
Dahlsrud, 2008) has increasingly become an area of government involvement. A growing 
body of literature reveals that national governments across the world are employing diverse 
practices to promote CSR (Albareda, Lozano and Ysa, 2007; Albareda, Lozano, Tencati, 
Midttun and Perini, 2008; González and Martinez, 2004; Podsiadlowski and Reichel, 2014; 
Rossouw, 2005; Vallentin, 2015a; Waagstein, 2011). However, governments’ motivation for 
engagement in and with CSR has not received extensive critical attention.  
Much of the past and recent critical academic research into CSR has focused on the 
roles of business as political actors (e.g. Ehrnström and Fuentes, 2016; Fooks et al 2013; 
Neron 2013; Scherer and Palazzo 2011; Scherer et al, 2014; Scherer, 2018; Whelan, 2012), 
leaving the issue of the role of government actors relatively underdeveloped or neglected as a 
research field. Most existing studies that examine government engagement with CSR tend to 
focus on the form that the government intervention takes or should take (e.g. Albareda et al., 
2007; Albareda et al., 2008; Vallentin and Murillo, 2012; Keskitalo, Juhola, and Westerhoff, 
2012). That said, some of those studies do provide nuanced accounts of government policies 
and mechanisms, and some do adopt political and critical approaches. For instance, Vallentin 
(2015a) and Vallentin and Murillo (2012) demonstrate that a single government’s CSR 
initiatives can be informed by different and often contradictory ideological understandings of 
CSR, each with its own set of assumptions and exclusions promoting a specific “truth” about 
CSR (Vallentin, 2015a, p. 40).  
However, to date, the underlying logic of a government’s engagement with CSR has 
received limited analytical scrutiny. Overwhelmingly, the existing literature implicitly or 
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explicitly assumes that the role of governments in this policy area is underpinned by a sense 
of accountability to the electorate and an attendant obligation to address certain social goals, 
meet environmental protection standards and/or particular economic growth objectives. In 
this context, governments are largely understood as socially- and/or business-oriented actors 
and are not considered to be “political” actors with their own interests: they are thought to be 
merely serving or assisting the public good.  
Moreover, business-government relations, specifically in the CSR policy area, are not 
typically seen as being politically confrontational but mainly as cooperation and collaboration 
designed to build “acceptable” regulatory environments and achieve common aims (e.g. 
Midttun, 2005). We suggest that these assumptions need to be examined critically, 
particularly if we are to provide explanations of government (in)effectiveness in promoting 
ethical business behaviour and in order to have the tools to question the legitimacy of 
government activity (Edward and Willmott, 2013). Accordingly, the primary purpose of this 
paper is to expound a particular political understanding of government engagement with CSR 
and develop an approach that permits a critical interpretation and evaluation. 
Our thinking is informed by the writings of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, in 
particular, their social theory of hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 2013). The 
“political” is central to Laclau and Mouffe’s understanding of social relations and it is 
conceptualised as requiring two components – antagonism and hegemony. They understand 
the “political” as an antagonistic relationship between social actors where the identity of a 
given social actor is both constituted through and threatened by the presence of others 
(Mouffe, 2013). Political action is, therefore, seen as an articulatory, discursive process 
where social actors attempt to formulate and convey their own and others’ identities in 
competing ways. Successful articulations erase antagonisms and establish a (temporary) 
dominance of one discursive ideological structure. Such articulations are termed 
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“hegemonic” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).  Consequently, society as a whole is seen a product 
of hegemonic articulations (Mouffe, 2013).  
This approach to the “political” differs from the existing “politically embedded 
accounts” (Vallentin and Murillo, 2012, p. 828) of government roles in CSR, where, for 
example, an institutional or national business systems approach sees governments in different 
nation states as the regulatory backdrops that shape the prevailing CSR understanding and 
practice but do not occupy antagonistic positions in relation to other social actors (see for 
example, Jamali and Karam, 2018; Kang and Moon, 2012; Matten and Moon, 2008). It also 
differs from Scherer and Palazzo’s (2011) “political CSR” that defines CSR as the corporate 
contribution to global governance and the provision of public goods through deliberative and 
democratic collaboration with other social actors.  
More significantly, another key difference is in the understanding of the ontological 
status of CSR. Laclau and Mouffe’s framework allows the treatment of government 
engagement with CSR as a political activity by understanding “CSR” not as a set of desired 
organisational behaviours but as an element of discourse with particular constitutive 
functions. Significantly, the notion of discourse is central to Laclau and Mouffe’s 
conceptualisation. Discourses are broadly defined as structured complexes of textual and 
non-textual practices – utterances, images – that can be employed, consciously or 
unconsciously, by various social actors to produce certain meanings, legitimise certain 
positions and marginalise others (Howarth, 1998; Spicer and Fleming, 2007; Walton and 
Boon, 2014). For example, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) suggest that established terms such as 
“order” or “democracy” can function as “empty signifiers” or discursive elements that are 
themselves devoid of meaning but can be employed to erase social antagonisms and establish 
certain discourses as hegemonic. Similarly, other scholars have demonstrated how notions 
such as “sustainability” and “environmental protection” can function as empty signifiers that 
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help articulate particular business practices as aligned with environmental concerns (Archel, 
Husillos and Spence, 2011; Brown, 2016; Davidson, 2010; Methmann, 2010; Stavrakakis, 
1997). By these means, business actors can associate themselves, or are associated by others, 
with environmental concerns without establishing a single understanding of either the nature 
of environmental concerns or the actions needed to address them. If and when the meaning of 
“sustainability” and “environmental protection” is substantiated, it remains conditional, 
resting on the particular circumstances of individual social actors. Crucially, the studies 
above politicise the notions of “environmental protection” and “sustainability” by presenting 
them not as mere denotations of technical mechanisms and processes and but as vehicles of 
power in themselves that allow social actors to create hegemonic discourses (Laclau, 2007; 
Howarth, 1998; Methmann, 2010; Swyngedouw, 2011). Reflecting on whether “CSR” may 
similarly function as an empty signifier allows us to view it as a discursive device that 
governments can deploy to buttress particular political positions whilst not necessarily 
pursuing responsible firm behaviour as a primary objective.    
We support our contention about the politicisation of government engagement with 
the “CSR” notion by analysing the government discourse in one country, the Russian 
Federation, during one particular historical period, 1991-2012. Our analysis indicates that the 
office of the President of the Russian Federation used “CSR” as a discursive device that 
helped it locate large Russian businesses as subordinate to the government and legitimise the 
government coercion of those business organisations. Accordingly, we proffer a theoretical 
understanding of government use of the CSR notion not only as a technical or technocratic 
exercise in achieving particular social and economic goals, but also as a political activity 
where governments can employ the signifier “CSR” in power struggles to position 
themselves in certain ways vis-à-vis other social actors.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: We start by discussing three main 
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established interpretations of government engagement with CSR. We then show how these 
explanations implicitly presume that government actions are driven by social accountability 
and the cooperative pursuit of common goals. Next, we explain how Laclau and Mouffe’s 
(1985) social theory of hegemony may help assemble a more critical understanding of 
government involvement with CSR. After outlining our methods, we present our analysis of 
the Russian government’s engagement with CSR through the lens of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
social theory of hegemony. The article closes with a summary of our findings and a 
discussion of how we see the contributions of our study in relation to the existing scholarly 
discussions on governmental engagement with CSR. 
 
Accounting for Government Engagement with CSR: Some Alternative Explanations  
It is possible to identify several main interpretations of how and why governments may 
involve themselves in CSR, ranging from the perceived decline of states to the putative 
failure of a voluntary approach to CSR and to the consequence of insufficient business 
resources or the government as a self-interested political actor. We now turn to discuss each 
of these understandings in turn so as to provide the context for subsequent empirical and 
theoretical sections of this paper.  
 
A Consequence of State Decline? 
When attempting to account for government engagement with CSR, the first explanation that 
emerges from the extant literature is the putative decline of states and governmental 
authority. Many studies of government engagement in CSR observe that the power balance 
between governments and business has shifted in favour of the latter (Moon, 2004). Some 
authors argue that governments are unable to cope with the increasing complexity of 
economic and political life, leaving a regulatory void that powerful business actors exploit for 
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their own ends. In what Santoro (2010, p. 286) calls the “post-Westphalian globalization 
narrative”, multinational corporations are seen as particularly powerful (Kobrin, 2009; 
Scherer, Palazzo and Matten, 2009; Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). The lack of enforceable 
international regulation allows them to seize a leading role in shaping the “global rules of the 
game” (van Oosterhout, 2010, p. 257). Multinationals’ wealth, knowledge, and capabilities 
are also often so substantial, especially in comparison with those of governments in 
developing countries where they operate that the citizenry of those countries may well turn 
towards multinationals instead of their own government as an essential supplier of social 
goods (Beddewela and Fairbrass 2015; van Oosterhout, 2010). In extreme cases, 
multinational corporations become de-facto governments by controlling and maintaining 
infrastructure, social services, and security forces (Banerjee, 2008; 2010). Similar trends can 
also be discerned in the industrialised world where governments are increasingly 
withdrawing from administering certain areas of public life such as infrastructure and 
healthcare through the mechanisms of privatisation and market liberalisation (Moon, 2005; 
Steurer, 2010).  
In this context, CSR promotion is seen as an alternative method for governments to 
steer business activity and achieve social and environmental objectives (Standing, 2007). 
With an emphasis on the voluntary commitment of corporations towards ethical behaviour, 
CSR can be regarded as a form of “soft law” that can assist governments in delivering their 
social and environmental objectives in areas where “hard law” is absent, impractical or 
resisted (Steurer, 2010). Equally, Vallentin and Murillo (2012) and Vallentin (2015a) herald 
CSR facilitation as a “governmentality” approach for controlling businesses that relies on re-
shaping the social norms of business conduct rather than influencing firms through direct 
regulation.  
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A Result of Failing Voluntary CSR? 
The second reason cited in the existing literature which rationalises and calls for the active 
government involvement in CSR is the assertion that a purely voluntary approach would fail 
to deliver responsible behaviour in firms. This perspective, in contrast to the one above, 
views the nation states as still powerful and significant and holds that the voluntary nature of 
CSR allows corporations to shape their practices in a way that primarily or solely rewards 
business owners rather than other stakeholders (Eberhard-Harribey, 2006; Fairbrass, 2011). 
In the absence of a powerful societal actor, such as a government, which could 
counterbalance the dominance of corporations in defining “responsibility”, business interests 
can hijack the CSR agenda. Essentially, governments act (or need to act) as a “referee” whose 
role it is to enforce ethical and responsible behaviour amongst otherwise misbehaving firms.  
There is also recognition that market mechanisms may be insufficient to ensure 
responsible conduct (Aaronson, 2007; Fairbrass 2011). This renders voluntary CSR a second-
best alternative to government regulation in many areas (Vogel, 2005: 164). In much of the 
current capitalist discourse, economic efficiency is more highly valued than meeting the 
demands of non-shareholder in defining the social legitimacy of the firm (Banerjee, 2010). 
Moreover, many social groups who are adversely affected by corporate activity are simply 
not powerful enough to challenge such entrenched notions of corporate legitimacy. In any 
case, consumers and employees may refuse to bear the cost of responsible behaviour in the 
form of higher prices and lower compensation (Vogel, 2005). Furthermore, small and 
medium-sized enterprises, which are not particularly visible in the public domain, tend not to 
face the same external pressures as large firms that would otherwise encourage them to act 
responsibly (Lynch-Wood, Williamson and Jenkins, 2009). Finally, it would be illogical to 
expect companies operating in countries with weak institutional systems to voluntarily 
behave responsibly as one of the reasons why they may have chosen to operate in such a 
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location is precisely the lack of government enforcement of responsible behaviour (Newell, 
2005).  
 
A consequence of insufficient business resources, expertise, or power?  
The third strand of literature is conceptually similar to the studies on failing voluntary CSR: it 
also acknowledges the continuing significance of the nation state (Vallentin and Murillo, 
2012). However, it does not generally regard voluntary CSR as problematic (Albareda et al., 
2007). On the contrary, voluntary CSR is often defined in terms of: 
 
“…business opportunities and value surplus as opposed to social problems, 
government deficits or governance gaps.” (Vallentin, 2015a, p. 41).  
 
Government-driven or orchestrated CSR is a means of achieving business competitiveness 
whilst simultaneously contributing to national economic growth and development (Vallentin 
and Murillo, 2012; Porter and Kramer, 2006).  Business, however, is regarded as potentially 
lacking the required resources, expertise, and social legitimacy or power to develop and 
execute voluntary CSR programmes with sufficient effectiveness and, therefore, require the 
help of more powerful and better resourced actors such as governments. Government 
intermediation may be needed because firms, while acting responsibly in some areas, 
demonstrate weak progress is others fields such as labour rights and corruption. Businesses 
alone may not have the capacity to address the broad systemic problems or developmental 
needs of whole countries (Barkemeyer, 2009).  
To illustrate this further, it should be noted that governments can and do build 
information portals, provide technical assistance, and organise professional networks 
(Albareda et al., 2007; Fox et al., 2002). The writings of Vallentin (2015a) and Vallentin and 
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Murillo (2012) are particularly seminal in this area as they explicitly recognise the “positive” 
as opposed to the “restrictive” role that governments can play in facilitating responsible 
business conduct. These scholars cite the example of Denmark where the government has 
initiated information and training programmes targeting small and medium enterprises in 
order to “mainstream” CSR and “help” SMEs with limited resources “manage social and 
environmental challenges in the supply chain and comply with demands and expectations 
from governments, industry and NGOs” (Vallentin, 2015a; p. 40). Vallentin and Murillo 
(2012, p. 826) describe how the Danish government is increasingly working “to help private 
companies identify/create and act upon strategic opportunities in their environment.”  
Specifically in relation to large businesses, Vallentin (2015a; p. 41) found that the 
Danish government attempted to “inspire” companies to be more proactive in the CSR 
domain through instituting mandatory CSR reporting that nonetheless does not require the 
companies to actually engage in CSR. Additionally, the Danish government took a lead in 
creating an independent forum where government, business, and civil society would come 
together to address disputes involving business breaches of human rights. Business 
organisations on their own would not have possessed the legitimacy required for an 
establishment of such a forum. 
Having considered some of the widely discussed explanations for government in 
CSR, we now move to reflect on the role of governments as “socially responsible actors” 
with a view to exploring further their motivations and raising some questions about how and 
why governments engage in CSR. 
 
The Critical Question: Governments as Socially Responsible Actors? 
Given the discussion above, it could be implied that government engagement with CSR is 
motivated by the necessity to address the needs of its own stakeholders: the electorate, the 
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business community, and the economy as a whole. In rare direct statements, Albareda et al. 
(2008) and Midttun (2005) buttress this understanding by characterising the role of 
government as a “regulator” and “supporter” of business and as a “provider” of public 
services and an “aggregator” of collective social interests. According to these accounts, CSR 
is understood as a goal – responsible business conduct – that the government is attempting to 
achieve in order to address social, environmental and economic concerns. 
This understanding of government engagement with CSR and of the function of CSR 
in government activity and rhetoric has not been much critically discussed or questioned. 
Governments may be seen to be benign and disinterested altruistic actors. By contrast, some 
scholars outside business and management studies do adopt more critical outlook on 
government activity. For instance, political scientists tend to view governments as potentially 
self-interested social actors (Caselli and Cunningham, 2009). De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson 
and Morrow (2005) in their influential text The Logic of Political Survival argue that the 
main goal of any incumbent government and its officers is to remain in that position.  
At this juncture, it is important to emphasise that previous and recent CSR studies 
routinely suggest that business organisations’ primary motivation for engaging in CSR is 
their own successful continuation. This can take the form of a “business case for CSR” where 
profit motives underlying CSR activities are regarded as healthy and legitimate. By contrast, 
other authors critique the “business case” for ultimately prioritising the needs of the owners 
and investors at the expense of other stakeholders (e.g. Brei and Böhm, 2013). The viability 
of the “political CSR” model underpinned by deliberative democracy (Scherer and Palazzo, 
2011) has also been questioned in terms of the fundamental self-interest of corporations 
(Whelan, 2012). Vallentin (2015b), in a review of critical perspectives of CSR, writes about 
the politicised understanding of CSR advanced by critical scholars as one which points to the 
ultimate self-interests of business actors and to CSR functioning “as an ideological cover-up 
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for modern corporate capitalism” (p. 15). Whichever view is adopted, an understanding of 
CSR as something other than an authentic business effort to address social and environmental 
concerns is central to critical CSR literature.  
We suggest that a critical attitude should also be extended to include government 
engagement with CSR, a task that has been largely neglected until now, thus positioning 
governments as “political actors” and not merely “technical regulators”. We contend that the 
motivations of governments need to be scrutinised as rigorously as those of business actors. 
Ultimately, we consider the possibility that from the point of view of governments, the 
function of “CSR” notion may not be limited to a representation of responsible business 
conduct: it may serve other less benevolent goals. The next section explains the philosophical 
underpinnings of our critique.   
 
Social Theory of Hegemony and “CSR” as a Political Tool 
Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) social theory of hegemony has provided the tools to politicise 
widely used concepts such as “order” and “freedom” by considering their constitutive 
function as elements of discourse as opposed to treating them as denotations of specific social 
phenomena. The social theory of hegemony explains how certain discursive elements can 
become devices that make possible the establishment of hegemonies (i.e. dominant 
discourses that shape sensemaking within societies). A similar re-consideration of the 
ontological status of “CSR” would permit us to examine it, not as a form of organisational 
behaviour (that may be either universal or vary from one institutional context to another), but 
as a political device. This approach leads to an examination of government engagement with 
“CSR” not only as an exercise in reaching a particular technocratic objective (such as 
reduced environmental pollution), but also as part of the struggle for political legitimacy and 
influence in relation to other social actors.   
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In Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) framework, discourse has constitutive power. They 
conceptualise social relations and sensemaking as being constituted through discourse, and 
define discourse as temporarily and partially fixed systems of meanings that influence 
“cognitive scripts, categories and rationalities” (Torfing, 1999, p. 82). The discourses that 
come to supress or incorporate other competing discourses are regarded as “hegemonic”.  
The fundamentals of this approach derive from Saussurean linguistics where language 
is treated as a system of relations between signifiers (e.g. assemblages of letters and sounds 
that form words) and signified (the meanings).  The relationship between the signifier and the 
signified itself is arbitrary: any signifier can be attached to any signified. As signifiers can be 
attached to many signified, they are said to be “overdetermined” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 
p. 98) and the links between signifiers and signified are not reified: for example, for some the 
meaning of “Corporate Social Responsibility” has evolved over time from “philanthropy” to 
“ethics of core company activities” (Carroll, 1999).  
In addition, the substance of the identity (also known as a “sign”) that results from the 
link between a signifier and a signified is not essential but emerges only in a differential 
relationship with other identities (Torfing, 1999). For instance, “CSR” can only be 
understood in a differential relation to concepts such as “profit” or “shareholder value”. 
Language, therefore, is an unstable “relational system of differences” (Methmann, 2010, p. 
351).  
In this context, discourse is a structure that includes certain differentially related 
identities and excludes others, temporarily fixing the relationships between them. This fixing 
is accomplished through the process of “articulation” that modifies the identities of free-
floating discursive “elements” that may have many meanings into fixed “moments” with a 
specific meaning within a particular discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 105). 
Articulation involves two contradictory but nonetheless co-existing logics – that of difference 
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and of equivalence. The logic of difference temporarily fixes the meaning of elements 
through emphasising their particular mutual differences. The logic of equivalence seeks to 
delimit the boundaries of a discursive system by emphasising a “certain sameness” between 
differentially articulated moments (Torfing, 1999, p. 301). For instance, differing political 
parties in one country can all present themselves as committed to “law and order” even 
though individually their understanding of what equates to an acceptable form of order and 
order-keeping differs. The empty signifier “law and order” serves to articulate the diverging 
parties as equivalent and united in their commitment to “order”.  Overdetermination of 
signifiers and the existence of competing discourses, however, prevents a permanent fixing of 
meanings. Hence, a discourse is always an unstable and “fictitious fixing of meaning” 
(Laclau, 1996, p. 205).  
From Laclau and Mouffe’s perspective, political struggles involve different parties 
attempting to hegemonise their own versions of equivalential or differential relations 
(Torfing, 1999). Hegemonic discourses that emerge as (temporary) winners of political 
struggles are distinguished by their success in emphasising the equivalence between diverse 
range of positions and identities, including antagonistic ones (Torfing, 1999, p. 101). The 
integration of diverse positions into one discursive totality simplifies the political space by 
articulating disparate causes as having similar objectives (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 130). 
The consequences of such integration can be the formation of a hegemonic discourse in order 
to realise the chosen goals. 
The logic of equivalence that underlies hegemonies is made possible by the presence 
of a privileged category of signifiers that Laclau and Mouffe (1985) call “nodal points” in 
relation to which separate elements can be articulated as equivalent. The signifiers that form 
nodal points are in themselves empty of specific meaning, hence they are also called “empty 
signifiers”. They are empty because if they had a specific meaning, they would simply 
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become one more difference in a system of relational differences (Laclau, 2007). Instead, 
they have the potential to represent a chain of other signifiers, or to be filled with a variety of 
meanings, with the different meanings “sliding” under them (Torfing, 1999, p. 301; 
Davidson, 2010).  They also perform a naming function and create the possibility of diverse 
groups and positions being united under one label (Contu and Girei, 2014; Laclau, 2007).  
Thus, empty signifiers can temporarily suture social divisions by providing a single 
point of reference for otherwise diverging positions. For example, Stavrakakis (1997) 
describes how differing social practices have been allowed to become part of the “green” 
discourse by simply being named “green.” Empty signifiers represent the “systematicity of 
the [discursive] system” (Laclau, 2007, p. 39). Establishing hegemony involves deciding 
which meanings are allowed to slide under the empty signifiers (Laclau, 2007).  
The process of signifiers becoming nodal points is not arbitrary one. They can derive 
from a variety of “residual institutions” – earlier articulations, existing normative frameworks 
or broader established discourses – that make them meaningful and legitimate to many actors 
(Nabers, 2009, p. 197; Edward and Willmott, 2013; Kenny and Scriver, 2012). Long-
established signifiers such as “freedom”, “democracy”, and “order” often play a role in the 
construction of hegemonies.  
“CSR” and related terms such as “sustainability” and “business responsibility”, owing 
to their increasing use, have a clear potential to become empty signifiers. For example, 
Methmann (2010) describes how “climate protection” functions as an empty signifier and 
allows various social actors to articulate themselves as environmentally responsible without 
changing their practices. Brown (2016) similarly shows that essential emptiness of 
“sustainability” allows diverse social actors to present their activities as sustainable when, 
arguably, they are not actually sustainable. For example, Davidson (2010) describes how 
“sustainability” allowed for the development of new partnerships and organisational agendas 
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in urban planning in Vancouver:  
 
“[Sustainability]… [b]rought together a divergent group of practitioners via the 
notion that all are, in some way, involved in sustainability” (p. 398).  
 
This allowed different parties to re-imagine existing activities as relating to sustainability and 
provided them with a sense of coherence and unity. All these examples, however, largely 
concern the critique of the use of sustainability and related concepts by business actors to 
support the neo-liberal hegemony that benefits them (Fougère and Solitander, 2009). Below, 
in our paper, we apply the Laclau and Mouffe framework to examine the use of CSR concept 
by government actors in the Russian Federation. 
 
Methods 
We have selected Russian federal government CSR policy as an illustrative case to support 
our contention that government engagement with CSR should be treated more critically for 
the following reasons. Firstly, given that the Russian government has not been particularly 
known for its focus on social and environmental concerns, this is a fruitful situation in which 
to explore governmental uses of the “CSR” term that may not have been driven by such 
considerations (De Mesquita et al., 2009).  In addition, during the time period that we 
examine, Russian governments did begin to engage with the subject of non-financial 
responsibility of business and so could provide us with illuminating data. The form of 
engagement we observed could be said to resemble the “agora” approach (Albareda et al, 
2008; Crotty, 2014), that is the creation of and participation in forums where CSR and related 
topics were discussed by various stakeholders and certain expectations with regard to 
responsible business conduct were expressed. Finally, the development of Russian 
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government CSR engagement contained both periods of relative lack of conflict between 
government and business and also periods of open antagonism. Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) 
pre-condition for the emergence of empty signifiers is social antagonism or the existence of 
opposing discursive positions.  
 
“[T]he two conditions of hegemonic articulation are the presence of antagonistic 
forces and the instability of frontiers which separate them” (pp. 134-136).  
 
Thus, periods of antagonism between the Russian government and businesses offers a fertile 
ground for the examination of “CSR” as an empty signifier. The periods of relative accord 
and harmony furnish a useful comparison.  
At the start of our analysis below, we provide a brief description of the different 
periods in the emergence of Russian federal government-business relations as a way to 
contextualise the interpretation of our data. We delineate the temporal boundaries of our 
research from the establishment of the Russian Federation in 1991 to the mature stage of the 
international financial crisis in 2012.  Whilst pre-1991 and post-2012 events are by no means 
irrelevant, the demise of the Soviet Union and the 2014 conflict with Ukraine created 
radically different societal and political relations within Russia, and their analysis is outside 
the scope of this article.  
 With regard to the specific data collection and analyses methods, Laclau and Mouffe 
are famously non-specific (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002; Howarth, 1998; Walton and Boon, 
2014). As a result, in translating our theoretical stance into specific research methods we 
relied on existing publications containing discourse analyses based on the social theory of 
hegemony (e.g. Contu and Girei, 2014; Contu, Palpacuer and Balas, 2013; Kenny and 
Scriver, 2012; Methmann, 2010) and on the attempt by Walton and Boon (2014) to explicitly 
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construct a Laclau and Mouffe-inspired discourse analysis methodology.    
We constructed our case study by analysing both verbal and written utterances1 of the 
Russian federal government and parliamentary officials that included the “CSR” term and 
related terms such as “responsibility of business”. The English term “Corporate Social 
Responsibility” translates straightforwardly into Russian as “Корпоративная Социальная 
Ответственность”. It is, however, often shortened to “responsibility of business” 
(“ответственность бизнеса”) or “social responsibility” (“cоциальная ответственность”) or 
adjusted somewhat to “social responsibility of business” (“cоциальная ответственность 
бизнеса”). These are terms that are less cumbersome to pronounce in Russian but that carry 
the same broad connotations of business conduct that is mindful of its impact on society and 
environment2. We employed all these terms in our data search and treated all of them as 
potential empty signifiers equivalent to “CSR”.  
Our data set included a variety of Russian federal government records such as 
legislature and presidential decrees, policy papers, and national strategy documents publicly 
available in online repositories. We supplemented the government documentation with a 
large volume of data on business-government CSR-related interaction from less formal 
sources such as newspapers and news channels. Our data search was systematic: we ensured 
that we covered every year between 1991 and 2012, explored documents relevant to every 
major government body (the parliament and the office of the president), and traced the 
utterances of key state officials (namely Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev). We searched 
for documents that contained “CSR” and equivalent terms and also for those we could 
reasonably expect to contain them (e.g. policy documents on Russian national sustainable 
                                            
1 One of the authors of this paper is a native Russian speaker, which allowed for the analysis of texts that are not 
normally available in English. 
2 For example, the terms “Corporate Social Responsibility” and “social responsibility” are used interchangeably 
in the parliamentary hearings on the subject of “Corporate Social Responsibility in Russia: Aims, tasks, 
legislative provision” (Federal Council of RF, 2007), and the terms “Corporate Social Responsibility” and 
“responsibility of business” are used interchangeably in the parliamentary hearings titled “Corporate Social 
Responsibility in the period of crisis: Challenges, experience, possibilities” (Federal Council of RF, 2009).  
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development). As we aimed to explore “CSR” as an empty signifier, we did not look for the 
use of “CSR” and equivalent terms that was aligned with a specific definition but solely for 
the presence of “CSR” and equivalent terms such as “responsibility of business” in the text.  
As a result, we amassed a large variety of sources: presidential decrees, government 
reports, news articles, transcripts of parliamentary hearings, records of televised interviews, 
accounts of meetings with state officials published by business organisations, and video 
recordings of government officials’ speeches. 
Our analysis of the documents focused on articulations and the chain of equivalence 
produced through the use of the “CSR” (or equivalent) signifier (Howarth, 1998).  It included 
two distinct but partially overlapping stages. The first stage involved mapping out the 
timeline of the Russian government’s use of the “CSR” term and the contexts where it took 
place. The skeleton for the timeline was provided by the existing publications on the history 
of the business-government relations in post-Soviet Russia. We coded our textual data, noting 
how the extent of government references to “CSR” (or equivalent) varies across different 
historical periods set out in the skeleton timeline. In addition, we identified the different fora 
(such as formal policy documents, parliamentary hearings) and different relational situations 
(including the interactions between the president and the business leaders vs. the interactions 
between the parliament and the business leaders) where terms such as “CSR” and 
“responsibility of business” appeared. This allowed us to develop an overall understanding of 
the events and the social actors involved that structured our subsequent interpretation and 
helped us identify patterns in our data (Contu and Girei, 2013; Walton and Boon, 2014). It 
also meant that in the second stage of analysis we could employ a logic of deconstruction, in 
other words we could make visible the contingent nature of “CSR” significations by 
examining how these significations changed across time periods and relational contexts  
(Kenny and Scriver, 2012; Spicer and Fleming, 2007). Finally, an analysis of the ways in 
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which the intensity of the use of “CSR” (or equivalent) varied across temporal and relational 
contexts contributed to our contention that “CSR” functioned as an empty signifier.  
In the second stage, we explored and coded the articulations of “CSR” and equivalent 
terms such as “responsibility of business” in the government discourse. We also identified the 
themes that were closely linked to these terms: for example, presidential explanations of why 
Russian businesses should care about responsibility or the topics that consistently served as 
background for the discussion of responsibility. Overall, we searched for paradigmatic 
relationships (a relationship where discursive elements are able to stand for one another) 
between “CSR” or equivalent terms and other elements present in the government discourse 
(Contu and Girei, 2013). This allowed us to determine the discursive chain of equivalence 
held together by the “CSR” signifier. From this process we were able to discern the function 
that the “CSR” played in the government discourse.   
While we did not purposefully set out to analyse CSR-related discourses used by 
social actors other than the government, we could not help but note the Russian business 
leaders’ articulation of “business responsibility”. This was a side-effect of the fact that many 
government CSR-related iterations occurred in the context of discussions with the business 
leaders. A systematic analysis of business articulations was outside the remit of this paper. 
Nonetheless, the business articulations that we captured do provide a point of comparison 
that revealed the “slippage” (Spicer and Fleming, 2007, p. 521) in the articulations of “CSR” 
and enriched our understanding of the function of the “CSR” signifier in the Russian 
governments’ discourse.  
The two-phase analysis is reflected in our report of the findings below. We begin by 
briefly outlining the key periods in the development of the Russian federal government-
business relations. We then use this timeline to discuss the timing of the appearance of the 
“CSR” (or equivalent) signifier in government discourse. This is followed by an examination 
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of how “CSR” was articulated across different relational contexts and by an in-depth 
exposition of the “CSR” articulations in the context that emerged as the most important 
forum: the meetings between the President of the Russian Federation and the leaders of major 
Russian companies. Finally, we bring all the elements together in a discussion on the function 
of the “CSR” signifier in the Russian government discourse.  
 
The Case of Russian Federal CSR Policy 
The History of Russian Federal Government – Business Relations 
Yakovlev (2006), Rutland (2011), Frye (2002; 2006), and Hanson and Teague (2005) provide 
useful analyses of business-government relations in post-Soviet Russia. Typically, three main 
historical periods are identified by these authors: the presidency of Boris Yeltsin (1991-
1999), the presidency of Vladimir Putin (2000-2005), and the later presidency and prime 
ministry of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev (post-2005). The first period is commonly 
characterised by the dominance of the business interests over the federal government and the 
second by a radical shift in this balance of power that created an antagonistic ground for 
hegemonic political struggle. The third period saw relative stability that resulted from the 
federal government gaining control over business interests. 
The 1990s saw both federal and local government being dominated by business 
interests to the extent that different federal agencies competed with each other while 
supporting different business factions. Widespread corruption resulted. While the presidential 
office served as the only available source of arbitration for large businesses at the federal 
level, the President and political parties were heavily dependent on the oligarchs as a source 
of finance for access to the media at election times. Two noteworthy consequences of these 
business-government relations were endemic tax evasion by businesses and a privatisation 
process that saw vast quantities of assets, previously belonging to the public, being 
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appropriated and concentrated in a few well-connected hands. To this day, the latter endures 
in the memory of the Russian people as a traumatic event and perpetuates public mistrust of 
businesses.  
After the 1998 financial crisis, the federal government had to orchestrate a renewal of 
its own leadership to ensure its continuation. Vladimir Putin was chosen as the new face of 
the federal power, first as a prime minister and then as Yeltsin’s successor. His urgent 
concern was building a “vertical of power” consisting of a clearly delineated, legitimate 
hierarchy with the president at the top and regional administrations and industry interests 
below and result in the “rule of law” (Brown, 2001; Monaghan, 2012). To accomplish this, 
the federal executive extended support to the army, the national security and law enforcement 
apparatus. The relationship between the federal authorities and large business was made 
explicitly more “equidistant”, replacing personal informal meetings (at private country 
retreats) with official formal engagements (in the Kremlin). The President demanded that 
business be represented by official associations. The early 2000s saw the rapid growth of 
business organisations such as the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE), 
which represented established oligarchs mainly from extractive industries.  
Open antagonism between the President of the Russian Federation and business 
leaders such as Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, who resisted the new order, was 
typical of the period.  A poignant turning point was the 2003 meeting between president 
Putin and business leaders. At the meeting, the head of the Yukos oil conglomerate Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, who funded political opposition and, allegedly, harboured political ambitions 
of his own, accused the president’s office of orchestrating corrupt acquisitions transactions. 
The story of Khodorkovsky’s subsequent arrest on tax evasion charges, conviction, and 
protracted imprisonment featured widely in the global press. The event clearly demonstrated 
that the Kremlin had tax inspectors, the courts and the security services at its disposal. By 
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2005, the Russian executive had largely gained control over business. This paved the way for 
relative stability and the absence of government-business antagonism post-2005. 
 
The Timing of Government-Business “CSR” Discussions 
Our analysis shows that most of the federal government iterations involving the “CSR” term 
were made during the 2000-2005 period when the government-business antagonism was at its 
peak. Previously, during the Yeltsin years, the government did not employ the terms 
“responsibility of business” or “CSR” and, at best, engaged in a limited discussion of the role 
of business in addressing environmental and social problems in Russia. These roles were first 
mentioned two years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. It began 
with an attempt to develop environmental and social legislation that would support national 
sustainable development policy. The initial thrust came in the form of a presidential decree 
on Fundamentals of State Strategy of Russian Federation on Environmental Protection and 
the Guarantee of Sustainable Development (President of RF, 1994). This was followed by a 
number of other decrees. These early documents were mainly concerned with environmental 
legislation and depicted business organisations solely as objects of government regulation.  
In the 2000-2005 period, the references to “responsibility of business” and equivalent 
terms in formal policy documents continued to be very limited.  The sole document to 
employ a related term in this period was Key Points of Russian Sustainable Development 
Strategy by the Federal Council3 (Federal Council of RF, 2002). It advocated further 
legislation and promoted the “moral responsibility” of every individual in the country, 
including those individuals acting as business leaders. The Federal Council also published a 
report, specifically about CSR, which was designed as information bulletin rather than an 
expression of government expectations (Federal Council of RF, 2005). The scarcity of formal 
                                            
3 The Federal Council is the upper of the two chambers of the Russian federal Parliament.  
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policy and parliamentary debate, however, was more than compensated by multiple verbal 
pronouncements by the president on the subject of “CSR” in direct communication with 
business leaders. We will examine them in detail below. 
Once the government had gained control over business in 2005, the appearances of 
the “CSR” and related terms become less frequent in the presidential discourse. They 
increase again in speeches by President Dmitry Medvedev in 2010 when the effects of the 
international financial crisis and particularly of the 2008-2009 oil prices crash began to be 
felt in the Russian oil-dependent economy. In the intervening years, the CSR flame was kept 
alive in government corridors by the Federal Council. From 2007 to 2009, it ran annual 
hearings on the subject of CSR4 that were attended by representatives from the government, 
business, and civil society (Federal Council of RF, 2007, 2008, 2009). The office of the 
president also published several documents that engaged, albeit again to a limited extent, with 
the notion of business responsibility, focusing on environmental and social legislation: the 
Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation (President of RF, 2009), Action Plan for the 
Implementation of the Climate Doctrine (Government of RF, 2011), and the Concept of 
Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation up to 2020 (Government 
of RF, 2008).  
We suggest that the uneven presence of “CSR” articulations in the government 
discourse over the three different time periods (summarised in Table 1) points to the fact that 
the notion of “CSR” is linked with the presidential attempts to establish control over 
business. “CSR”, “business responsibility” and related terms appear most frequently in the 
most antagonistic phase where the battle-lines between the two groups, government and 
business, are most clearly drawn. President Yeltsin did not engage in discussions of “CSR” 
and did little to establish control over Russia’s oligarchy. By contrast, president Putin whose 
                                            
4 These hearings were titled “Corporate Social Responsibility and socio-economic development of Russia” 
(2007), “Corporate Social Responsibility and socio-economic development of Russia” (2008) and “Corporate 
Social Responsibility in the period of crisis: Challenges, experience, possibilities” (2009).  
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initial foremost objective was to establish the “vertical of power” referred to “CSR” (or 
equivalent) extensively in the early years of his presidency and held multiple discussions on 
the subject with the business leaders. It is significant that his use of “CSR” wanes around 
2005, a period that many commentators (Yakovlev, 2006; Rutland, 2011) identify as the end 
of the initial government-business power struggle. It is also striking that the initial concern 
about CSR comes from the office of the President and not from the Parliament that had an 
essentially “revolving door” relationship with the industry. This provides further supporting 
evidence that such signifiers are used by actors who are engaged in antagonistic relationships. 
In this case, the hostility existed primarily between the President and the business actors. 
 
---- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ---- 
 
The Relational Context of Government-Business “CSR” Discussion  
The variability in “CSR” articulations in different relational contexts similarly indicates that 
it was linked to the presidential struggle for control over business. There were three main fora 
where the “CSR” articulations appeared: formal policy documents, parliamentary hearings, 
and presidential discussions with the business leaders, the key one being the RUIE forums 
that occurred once or twice a year.  
As described in the previous section, the formal social and environmental policy 
documents contain very few references to “business responsibility” in addressing social and 
environmental concerns. For instance, the Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation 
(President of RF, 2009) focuses on the development of legal frameworks to support the 
environmental agenda. The subsequent Action Plan for the Implementation of the Climate 
Doctrine (Government of RF, 2011) contains practical points relating to legislation 
development. The closest the Climate Doctrine comes to discussing business engagement 
 26 
with climate change concerns is the call for a dialogue between all social actors and for 
government incentives that would support environment-friendly business modernization. A 
comparable document that deals with social development is the Concept of Long-Term Socio-
Economic Development of the Russian Federation up to 2020 (Government of RF, 2008). 
Similarly, it says little about the responsibilities of businesses, but calls for public-private 
partnerships to support social development.  
Having observed in the section above that the early interest in CSR comes from the 
office of the President and not from the Parliament, it is important to note that subsequently 
Parliament did become concerned with CSR.  Later parliamentary discussions made much 
greater use of the “business responsibility” notion. The participants of the 2007, 2008, and 
2009 Federal Council hearings that were specifically dedicated to CSR generally agreed that 
“CSR” was a form of business engagement with a variety of stakeholders, that it was 
important for business legitimacy within Russia, but that it should not take the form of using 
private funds to plug government budget gaps. Instead, companies should be equal partners in 
the public-private partnerships. Most of the discussion focused on social reporting which was 
heralded as vitally important for the competitiveness of Russian companies abroad.  
A common theme in the parliamentary discussions was a reluctance of the participants, 
representing government and business, to make CSR an object of government intervention. 
For instance, while noting that “the absence of standards of corporate responsibility” was a 
factor in weak foreign investment activity in Russia, government officials were professing the 
inferiority of regulation:  
 
“We really understand that legislating, development of regulations [including in the 
area of CSR] always lags behind life. And, perhaps, not every question can be 
addressed at the level of legislature, but there are also general rules of conduct.” 
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(Federal Council of RF, 2008: 5).  
 
Business leaders shared this position, for instance, by rejecting the possibility of companies 
being required to publish social reports. One representative from the Association of Russian 
Managers (Federal Council of RF, 2007, p. 37) argued that CSR was “not a position 
formulated by intellectuals and lowered from above, it is a position born of practitioners from 
below”.  Regulations such as the Sarbaines-Oxley Act were regarded as prohibitively 
expensive for companies to implement (Federal Council of RF, 2009). The vice-president of 
RUIE stated that  
 
“[We] are categorically against any control. Any activity, including voluntary activity, 
and we are speaking about the social responsibility of business, should be not be 
regulated by any laws, any norms. Only from the point of view of motivation, from the 
point of view of facilitation …” (Federal Council of RF, 2008, pp. 12-13).  
 
In the discussions with the office of the president, however, the business leaders’ stance 
was markedly different. Here, they explicitly asked for the government to adopt a more 
directive approach to social responsibilities of business. The requests often followed the 
business leaders’ concern about what they called “shadow social responsibility”. This term 
referred to an array of irregular dealings between local government authorities and businesses 
in relation to social programmes. It included government agencies making unjustifiable 
demands on the businesses (in the eyes of business) to participate in social programmes and 
included informally brokered tax break awards to businesses from local authorities for 
contributions to social programmes. 
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“Social programmes are financed on a local level or on the basis of private agreements 
that also provide opportunities for tax relief. “As a result, today we have the 
phenomenon of shadow social responsibility.” . . . ‘it is time for the government to 
abandon the thesis that the abilities of the government are limited and those of the 
business are unlimited. . . . Today business leaders do not receive clear signals from 
the government about what and how they need to do … business is waiting for the 
government expression of national priorities.’” (News coverage of and quotes from 
business leaders at the Second CSR Congress, Kondrashova, 2004) 
 
In the wake of the business-government disputes (and especially the Khodorkovsky 
case), business leaders were also desperate to clarify the “new rules of the game” in their 
relationship with the president (Frumkin, 2004). An explicit call for regulatory clarity in the 
area of CSR is contained in the Social Charter of Russian Business that RUIE ratified at its 
2004 summit. The Charter detailed the large Russian businesses’ position on CSR, declared 
that CSR was a way to achieve social and economic goals on the basis of “rational balance” 
in the interests of varied societal groups and stated that:  
 
“The interaction between business and government and business with the civil society 
must be built on a public regulatory foundation.” (RUIE, 2004).  
 
President Putin agreed with these requests in principle and also acknowledged the problem of 
government coercion of business into participating in social projects:  
 
“…the joint work of government and business must not lead to extorting business and 
forcing it into non-production expenses, but this, unfortunately, happens both in the 
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centre and in the regions. . . . There needs to be a regulatory base for joint 
[government-business] work on priority projects. . . . we expect a more active 
involvement [of business] in social projects.” (Putin, 2004) 
 
In practice, however, no action was taken to address business concerns. Business 
involvement in the development projects continued to be negotiated on a haphazard project-
by-project basis and the business leaders continued to express concern about it years later. 
For example, in a 2012 RUIE summit declaration it was stated that: 
 
“We need to perfect the regulative foundation of the social partnership systems on the 
basis of commonly recognised principles that exclude direct or indirect coercive 
involvement of employers in social partnerships or economically unjustified 
responsibilities” (RUIE, 2012: 9).  
 
To summarise, both the legislative and executive branches of the Russian government 
were reluctant to issue any formal policy or definitive guidelines on matters such as business 
participation in social development projects or non-financial reporting. Business leaders, 
however, reacted to this reluctance differently in different relational contexts. They were in 
full agreement with the parliament, but in the discussions with the president, they perceived 
the lack of formal guidelines as a threat and explicitly requested a “regulatory foundation” to 
be developed that would clarify their responsibilities and how they were to be fulfilled. This 
happened even when business leaders brought up the same problems in parliamentary and 
presidential discussions that they saw as related to CSR (such as government agencies using 
the notion of social responsibility of business to effectively extort funds from businesses to 
cover their own social budget deficits). This inconsistency suggests that, despite the same 
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terms being used, “social responsibility of business” was articulated differently and played 
different roles in the parliamentary and presidential contexts. This also meant that different 
contexts saw different articulation of government and business.  
In the next section, we focus specifically on the presidential articulations of “social 
responsibilities of business” and other themes that appear alongside the terms “CSR” or 
“responsibility of business” in Mr Putin’s and then Mr Medvedev’s iterations.   
 
Filling the Empty Signifier of “CSR” 
Our analysis revealed that three themes consistently appeared in the presidential iterations on 
the subject of business responsibility: 1) the social responsibility of business reflects 
contemporary social and economic concerns, 2) the “devastating privatisation” of the 1990s, 
and 3) the presentations of business responsibility as a personal responsibility of business 
leaders. Below we suggest that this variety of articulations indicates that “social 
responsibility of business” functions as an empty signifier in the Russian presidents’ 
discourse. We argue that the three themes are held in a chain of equivalence by the empty 
signifier of “social responsibility of business” that the Russian presidents then use to 
articulate leading Russian businesses as being legitimately subordinate to the government.  
Taking these iterations on order, firstly, the Russian presidents’ articulations of “social 
responsibilities of business” consistently related to the most pressing economic and social 
national concerns of the day. In the early Putin period, Mr Putin’s speeches on the subject of 
social responsibilities of business, particularly in the RUIE summits, were chiefly concerned 
with ensuring business compliance with tax regulations (Grigorjeva, 2003; Putin 2001). In a 
2003 special meeting of the Trade and Industry Chamber of the Russian Federation entitled 
“On the Social Responsibility of Business in Modern Russia”, Mr Putin spoke of the social 
responsibility of business as “resolution of social problems” such as poverty, low quality 
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living conditions of workers, guarantee of labour rights, elimination of black market 
employment and investing, together with the government, in education, healthcare, the 
environment and the army (Trade and Industry Chamber of RF, 2003). In one early meeting 
with the business leaders, Mr Putin started his talk about business responsibility with a 
request that the business leaders contribute around 1.5 bl. roubles (~ $53 mil. at the time) for 
a fund in support of the military personnel who served in Russia’s conflict regions (Putin, 
2001). These articulations of responsibility clearly reflected the primary concerns of the 
1990s and early 2000s: endemic business tax avoidance, economic depression, and military 
conflict in Chechnya.  
In the later Putin/Medvedev period, the expressed understandings of “responsibility” 
changed to reflect the central post-2008 international financial crisis and oil price decline 
issues. For instance, at a meeting of the Commission on the Modernisation and Technological 
Development of the Russian Economy in 2010, Mr Medvedev linked the social responsibility 
of business to investment in innovation as being crucial for Russia’s international economic 
competitiveness:  
 
“ ... big money presupposes big responsibility. We [government and business], together 
must make all possible effort to turn our economy in the direction of modernisation. . . . 
This means re-thinking the formula or social responsibility of business. It is not just 
philanthropy, and definitely not the payment of taxes that all naturally must pay. It is 
indeed the practical focus on innovation and, ultimately, the effective work of 
companies . . .” (Medvedev, 2010).  
 
Mr Putin also equated the social responsibility of business with the business contribution to 
Russia’s international competitiveness in a 2011 meeting with RUIE (CSR Journal, 2011). 
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The press reported that, while giving a speech on the social responsibility of business, Mr 
Putin pointed out that low labour productivity was among the key factors underpinning  
Russia’s low national economic competitiveness. He argued that it was inappropriate for 
business to economise on labour protection and workplace justice measures that could 
increase productivity, and that the government would plan out initiatives in this area that 
would be financed by business.  
Viewed in combination with the presidents’ refusal to address the business leader’s 
requests for clearer official guidelines on the social responsibilities of business, the shifts in 
the presidents’ articulations of “business responsibilities” indicate that it functions as an 
empty signifier. The absence of official guidelines leaves the “social responsibility of 
business” signifier open to be filled with different meanings, such as innovation and job 
provision, depending on the current priorities, which is exactly what the Russian presidents 
did do.  
The second theme that consistently appears alongside the notion of social 
responsibilities of business in post-2000 presidential iterations is the 1990s problematic 
privatisation. The actual word “responsibility”, in relation to the non-financial obligations of 
business, first appears in government discourse in January 2001 during the second meeting 
between president Putin and the leaders of the largest Russian companies. This and the first 
meeting in the summer of 2000 were held in the atmosphere of uncertainty about the nature 
of the relationship between the new president and the business elites. The business leaders 
were concerned about a potential review of the 1990’s legally murky privatisation process, 
despite president Putin denying it as a possibility. In the second meeting, Mr Putin 
categorically announced that the business “fear of the government” (i.e. fear of privatisation 
review) must be replaced by “the sense of responsibility for the people and the country” 
(Newsru.com, 2001; Putin, 2001). The link between the “social responsibility of business” 
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and the corporations’ ability to keep control over their assets was particularly clear in the 
2004 meeting between RUIE and president Putin where the Social Charter of Russian 
Business was presented.  Prior to the meeting, RUIE members were reported to say:  
 
“[I] am expecting that the president will address fundamental questions. How, for 
instance, does he understand “social responsibility of business”? … And what does he 
think about the societal hysteria about oligarchs and rich people in general?” (Sitnina 
and Grivach, 2004).  
 
“Vladimir Putin privately feels that the privatisation processes of the 1990 were unfair. 
As a result, there is a conviction that large business must take initiative in erasing its 
guilt before the society and the government.” (Sitnina and Grivach, 2004).  
 
“… oligarchs who created their empires in the time of Boris Yeltsin are trying to ask 
the government where and to what extent they must be “socially responsible” so that 
the government leaves them alone.” (Frumkin, 2004).   
 
President Putin, in his 2004 RUIE meeting speech, assured the business leaders that no 
privatisation revision would take place and, in the next sentence, started to outline his vision 
for the social responsibilities of business: 
 
“Overall, the government must [not ‘will’!] guarantee the immutability of the 
privatisation outcomes and of the protection of private property rights as one of 
foundations of the market economy. Civil servants must protect private property as 
much as the government property. From you [the business leaders] we expect higher 
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investment in social projects, science, education and in the development of the so-
called ‘human factor’ in general. Let us discuss this in more detail: We have already, 
more than once, spoken about the importance of a systemic understanding of the social 
responsibility of business……” (Putin, 2004).  
 
Despite these assurances, privatisation continued to surface in the discussions of social 
responsibilities of Russian business later. For example, at the 2010 meeting of the 
Commission on the Modernisation and Technological Development of the Russian Economy 
mentioned above, Mr Medvedev followed up his characterisation of the “social responsibility 
of business” as innovation and modernisation with a depiction of this responsibility as 
something that large companies owed the government for past privatisation support: 
 
“I think that it is a duty of all large private companies created in our country in recent 
years to make a serious contribution to the formation of a modern model of Russian 
economy, to Russian economic growth. All companies represented here at some point 
in the past received, in essence, definitive government support at different growth 
stages. This was connected with the re-distribution of resources in the 90s, and, 
recently, in the period of a crisis.” (Medvedev, 2010) 
 
We conclude that the Russian government uses the empty signifier of “social 
responsibility of business” to portray its own coercion of business into compliance with its 
varied demands as being legitimate. The coercion of business into performing particular 
activities takes form of a request for responsible behaviour. Responsible behaviour is 
articulated as something that businesses owe to the state (i.e. business leaders should not fear 
the re-evaluation of privatisation results as long as they pay the debt to the state and behave 
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responsibly in a way that the government prescribes). Acquiescence to government coercion 
is effectively labelled as “social responsibility of business”.  
The third theme consistently associated with the “social responsibility of business” in 
presidential articulations is the notion of responsibility as a desirable individual trait of the 
business leaders as opposed to an organisational characteristic or practice. For example, Mr 
Putin in a 2004 speech on the “systematic understanding of social responsibility of business” 
called on Russian businesses to develop a “healthy patriotic instinct, responsibility for own 
country” (Putin, 2004). Earlier, we mentioned that Mr Putin asked Russian businesses to 
develop a “sense of responsibility”. Words such as “instinct” and “sense” are more suitable 
for describing an individual state of mind as opposed to organisational practice. 
Later, both president Medvedev and prime minister Putin spoke about responsibility as 
a personal attribute of business leaders. In a 2010 meeting with the Federation of 
Independent Trade Unions, Mr Putin praised business owners for using their personal assets 
to save their companies during the financial crisis and stated that this signified a “maturing 
responsibility of business” (New Politics, 2010). Similarly, Mr Medvedev, during the 2010 
Summit of Social Teachers and Social Workers told his audience in a conversation about 
pension provision:  
 
“In my opinion, care for aged people is not only the responsibility of the government 
and the relatives, it must be the responsibility of all successful people. Those who 
reached success must make their contribution. But it does not mean that money should 
be extorted from them, of course not. It rather must be a moral need on their part.” 
(Granik, 2010) 
 
The speech of Prime Minister Putin at the XIX RUIE summit in 2012 (Putin, 2012) 
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brought up the “fundamental question” of the lack of business legitimacy in Russia caused by 
questionable privatisation process. As a measure to improve business legitimacy he proposed 
an individual tax on luxuries that would be “a moral and ethical measure”, which would 
encourage a “responsible approach” among business leaders, and would be a “socially 
recognized payment for the refusal to invest”. As the proposed tax applies to individuals and 
not organisations, Mr Putin presents responsibility as an individual and not an organisational 
practice.  
 
“CSR” as a Nodal Point in a Hegemonic Government Discourse 
We now bring all three strands of our analysis together: 1) that most of the government 
business “responsibility” iterations occur in the time period characterised by antagonism 
between government and business, 2) that most of business-responsibility government 
iterations happen in the most antagonistic institutional context (i.e. the interactions between 
the office of the president and the leaders of large Russian companies), and 3) that the 
Russian presidents fill the signifier of “social responsibility of business” with three key 
themes (economic/social concerns of the day, questionable past privatisation and personal 
responsibility). We contend that the timing, the context, and the nature of the presidential 
interpretations of the “social responsibility of business” indicate that the “social responsibility 
of business” (and equivalent terms) functioned as an empty signifier in the Russian 
presidential discourse and facilitated the establishment of a hegemonic discourse that would 
articulate and fix large Russian business as subordinate to government.  
 The Russian government does not define “social responsibility of business” in a stable 
manner. It articulates it differently in different time periods and different interaction contexts. 
Russian presidents go as far as ignoring explicit requests from the business leaders for an 
official definition of their social responsibilities. The multiplicity of shifting articulations 
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indicates that “social responsibility of business” functions as an empty signifier within the 
government discourse. The use of the “social responsibility of business” notion also allows 
the Russian presidents to label their coercion of business leaders (through the threat of 
privatisation re-evaluation) as a request for responsible behaviour. This labelling helps 
legitimise the government’s coercive practices and articulates business as being subordinate 
to the government. The fact that most of these articulations occur in the temporal and 
relational context characterised by antagonism between businesses and the Russian executive 
further points to the fact that they constitute part of the Russian presidents’ attempt to 
establish a hegemonic discourse where business subordination of government would become 
normalised. The individualisation of social responsibility of businesses by articulating it as a 
personal trait of the business leaders as opposed to an organisational practice further serves to 
legitimise presidential coercion of individual business leaders such as Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky. Again, this function of the “social responsibility of business” feeds into the 
government bid to fix the identity of business as subordinate to government, effectively 
supporting the “vertical of power” agenda. 
 Returning to our aim to politicise and critically question government engagement with 
CSR, we suggest that our analysis of the Russian federal government CSR discourse provides 
an example where the function of the “CSR” (or equivalent) term in the government officials’ 
discourse is not limited to the facilitating of more ethical business conduct. Instead, the use of 
“CSR” or the “social responsibility of business” has the effect of legitimising the presidential 
coercion of individual business leaders. It is used as a political tool that aids the government 
in articulating disparate elements such as the various pressing social needs, the debt that large 
Russian businesses supposedly owe to the government for turning the blind eye to 
privatisation irregularities, and the responsibility of business leaders as individuals as 
equivalent moments under the umbrella of the “social responsibility of business”. All three of 
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these now fixed moments come to represent aspects of the “social responsibility of business”. 
The “social responsibility of business” systematises government discourse. The established 
chain of equivalence articulates business responsibility in a way that naturalises business 
subordination to the government. The outcome is the cancelling out of the antagonism 
between government and business and suturing of the Russian political landscape. 
 Figure 1 is a graphical representation of our findings. The left half illustrates the 
structure of the Russian federal government “CSR” discourse. The rights side is a proposed 
representation of the alternative discourse offered by the Russian businesses. As mentioned in 
the discussion of our methods above, business discourse was not our object of study. 
However, given that most of the government utterances that we analysed were made in the 
context of meetings with business leaders, we could not avoid noting some aspects of 
business articulations of their social responsibilities. The nature of business articulations is 
represented by the dashed line.  
 
---- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ---- 
 
 
Discussion 
In this section, we summarise our findings and provide a brief discussion of how we see the 
contributions of our study in relation to the existing scholarly discussions on governmental 
engagement with CSR. We will also reflect on the generalizability of our results to contexts 
other than Russian Federation.  
We have provided an empirical example that supports our contention that government 
engagement with CSR should be treated with the same critical consideration as business 
engagement. We drew our example from a historical analysis of the federal government’s 
CSR (social responsibility of business) discourse in the Russian Federation. Laclau and 
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Mouffe’s (1985) social theory of hegemony provided a philosophical and methodological 
framework for analysing and theorising CSR in that context. Most importantly, this approach 
allowed us to view “CSR” from a different ontological perspective, not as a feature of 
corporate behaviour, but as a rhetorical device that enables the construction of hegemonic 
discourses that then legitimise and normalise particular meanings, the positions of social 
actors, and the forms of social relations. After considering the thematic content of the 
government utterances, their timing, and the relational contexts in which they appear, we 
conclude that “CSR” (and equivalent terms such as “social responsibility of business”) 
functions as an empty signifier in the Russian government’s discourse, permitting the Russian 
presidents to legitimise their coercion of individual business leaders and position business as 
subordinate to the government.  
Our key contribution is the development of a political understanding of government 
engagement with CSR that does not presume that governments are the civically-minded 
regulators of business. We argue that “CSR” can be fruitfully viewed as an element of 
discourse that allows government actors to structure social realities in particular ways, 
legitimise their positions, and protect their interests. We build on and extend a body of 
previous post-structural studies that critically examine the socio-cultural effects of signifiers 
such as “environmental protection”, “climate protection” and “globalisation” in the 
discourses of various social actors (Methmann, 2010; Spicer and Fleming, 2007; Stavrakakis, 
1997; Swyngedouw, 2011).  
Nonetheless, we conclude that our political understanding of government engagement 
with CSR as being complementary to (rather than contradictory) current notions of “political 
CSR”. For instance, we find that some of the Russian government’s articulations of “social 
responsibility of business” were not far removed from what Scherer and Palazzo’s (2011) 
termed “political CSR”: the Russian government referred to the “social responsibility of 
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business” as being a type of business-partnering with other social actors such as local 
authorities in production of public goods. Treating “CSR” as an element of discourse, 
however, allows for a deeper and richer analysis of power dimensions in such government-
business deliberations about the production of beneficial social outcomes (Fairbrass and 
Zueva-Owens, 2012; Whelan, 2012).  
In addition, similar to Vallentin’s (2015a) findings in connection to the Danish 
government, we reveal that the Russian government’s articulations of “social responsibility 
of business” varied at different points in time. However, while Vallentin (2015a) explored the 
ideological understandings that underlay the government’s articulations of CSR, our focus is 
on the role that the term “CSR” can play in broader government discourses, itself supporting 
and legitimising particular ideological positions. Overall, our work offers a new perspective 
to an existing conversation about political aspects of government engagement with CSR and 
opens up further possibilities for a more nuanced examination of government engagement in 
CSR policy and policy-making. 
Clearly, our example of the Russian Federation concerns only one specific country 
and one specific historical period and therefore is not wholly generalisable to other contexts. 
Some may consider the case of the Russian Federation to be extreme as it involves a socio-
political situation that is discernibly different from the Western case studies that most 
frequently serve as a test-bed for the study of CSR. Arguably, our findings make a minor 
contribution to the institutional CSR literature (e.g. Jamali and Karam, 2018; Kang and 
Moon, 2012; Matten and Moon, 2008) by describing Russian government’s articulations of 
“CSR”. Some of these articulations are broadly consistent with the “developmental” (i.e. 
focused on national development) type of CSR found by Kang and Moon (2012) in state-led 
market economies. Simultaneously, however, some of the Russian government’s “CSR” 
articulations and their evolution over time are similar to the Danish government’s 
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articulations as identified by Vallentin (i.e. where there was an initial focus on employment 
issues and subsequent focus on national development through increased business 
competitiveness). Nonetheless, our key objective is not to evaluate the activities of the 
Russian government or to discover the meaning of “CSR” in the Russian context. This would 
involve a different ontological treatment of “CSR” to the one we adopted here. Instead, we 
develop an alternative, political perspective about the governmental use of the “CSR” notion. 
We contend that our findings expose the politicisation of government’s use of “CSR” and 
that these results will trigger critical studies across a range of different national contexts.  
While we acknowledge that it is unlikely that our case-specific findings will be 
replicable in other national or regional contexts, we contend that the analytical generalisation 
of our broad conclusions is possible. Analytical (theoretical) generalisation involves building 
theory on a basis of empirical observation (Yin, 1994). We are aware it is uncommon in 
management research or political science to use findings from the so-called “peripheral” 
(non-Western) countries to build theory that may create new understandings in other parts of 
the world. Postcolonial theorists have long noted that the research conducted in the Western 
“core” has potential of gaining a place in the global scholarly conversation whereas findings 
from non-Western contexts are generally regarded as having local applicability only 
(Hoffman, 1977; Tickner and Wæver, 2009).  This may well apply to Russia, which for 
centuries has served as the constitutive “other” to the West, regarded both in the West and by 
some internal factions as either a “barbarous state” or as a “learner” who is yet to absorb 
Western traditions (Browning, 2003; Jensen, 2017; Morozov, 2015). Neumann (1999) and 
Kuus (2004) observe that while the rise of postcolonial scholarship has led to reflection on 
how historical circumstances contribute to the modern representations of nations outside the 
core “West”, such reflexivity rarely extends to discussions of Russia. 
However, those scholars who are working in the poststructural international relations 
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literature increasingly challenge this status quo and argue that  
 
“…discourses in the periphery can offer a penetrating critique of the assumptions, 
norms, and practices governing the social models in the core” (Makarychev and 
Morozov, 2013, p. 334).  
 
Knowledge from the periphery can help challenge the parochialism and assumed universal 
applicability of the knowledge from the “core” and itself contribute to new internationally 
applicable understandings (Jack and Westwood, 2009; Tickner, 2013). The latter aim, in 
particular, could be accomplished by paying attention to the possible similarities between 
different national systems as opposed to consistently “othering” the non-West. As mentioned 
at the start of this paper, some authors see all governments (whether in the West or not) as 
driven by the need to stay in power and therefore at least partly self-interested (De Mesquita 
et al., 2005). Others note while nations with different governmental systems may differ in 
how they score on certain parameters (such as levels of corruption, property rights 
protection), the development of such parameters in different nations over time often follows 
similar trends (Besley, 2006), suggesting that cross-fertilisation of research from different 
locations is possible. We suggest as much for the possibility of analytical generalisation from 
our findings from Russia.  
At a more basic level, our findings highlight the possibility of governmental self-
interest (De Mesquita et al., 2005) in the use of CSR discourse. The case of the Russian 
Federation demonstrates that the primary function of terms such as “CSR” and 
“responsibility of business” in the government discourse may not always be to promote 
socially and environmentally responsible business conduct. This warrants a more critical 
stance towards government engagement with CSR in different parts of the world. “CSR” 
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could function as an empty signifier in the discourse of the diverse nation states with 
authoritarian-type governmental systems because such governments are likely to have 
antagonistic relationships with other social actors (De Mesquita et al., 2005). Governments in 
developed liberal democracies may draw on “CSR” and related concepts because of their 
established social visibility and legitimacy. Existing studies already indicate that the use of 
notions such as “climate protection” by large international governmental organisations (for 
example, the WTO and the OECD) performs a political function, specifically leading to the 
re-branding of “business as usual” as being environmentally progressive (when it may not 
actually be) and stifling progress on the climate protection front as a result (see for example, 
Methmann, 2010). 
At a broader level, the treatment of “CSR” as an element of discourse, as opposed to a 
desired form of organisational behaviour, creates opportunities for examining the different 
forms of power relations that may exist between different social actors and exploring how 
these power relations are established and reproduced through the use of “CSR” and related 
notions. The social actors in question may be different in any given context and so may be 
the forms of power relations involved, but their scrutiny is made possible by a theorising of 
“CSR” as a vehicle of power within discourse. As a result of its residual institutional heritage, 
built up over the last few decades, “CSR” has the strong potential of becoming an empty 
signifier and therefore a device employed by various social actors in a variety of political 
interactions (Nabers, 2009). This may be particularly the case in developed countries where 
the “CSR” term has been in use for a long period by a wide variety of social actors and, 
therefore, attained significant social legitimacy.  
 
Conclusion 
The aim of our research was to question the predominant understanding of government as a 
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benign actor in the literature on government engagement with CSR. Drawing on Laclau and 
Mouffe’s (1985) social theory of hegemony has enabled us to consider “CSR” from a 
different ontological perspective and to treat it as a constitutive element of discourse rather 
than a denotation of particular organisational behaviours. Our analysis of the government’s 
use of “CSR” in the Russian Federation demonstrates that “CSR” can function as an “empty 
signifier” – a privileged discourse element that serves establish hegemonic discourses that 
erase antagonisms between different social actors. In the case of the Russian Federation, 
viewing “CSR” as an element of discourse has allowed us to demonstrate how it has served 
to legitimise the dominance of the Russian government over large Russian business 
organisations. Ultimately, we suggest that it is not only businesses but also the governments 
that can hijack the notion of CSR to promote agendas other than social development and 
environmental protection. We therefore call for more detailed and critical study of 
government engagement with CSR across a range of types of polities and economies 
worldwide.  
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Table 1: Russian federal CSR policy timeline  
Year Document/Event Presence of CSR/responsibility of 
business discourse 
1994 4 Feb - Decree5 by the President of Russian Federation №236 Fundamentals of state strategy of Russian 
Federation on environmental protection and the guarantee of sustainable development (President of RF, 
1994) 
Marginal 
1996 1 Apr - Decree by the President of Russian Federation №440 On the Concept of Transition of Russian 
Federation to Sustainable Development (President of RF, 1996) 
8 May - Directive of the Government of the Russian Federation №559 On the Development of the Project of 
State Strategy for Sustainable Development of the Russian Federation (Government of RF, 1996) 
Marginal                                                                      
              
Marginal 
1997 10 Dec - Decree by the President of Russian Federation №1300 On the Concept of National Security of 
Russian Federation (President of RF, 1997) 
Marginal 
1998 12 Nov - National Action Plan for Environmental Protection 1999-2001 (State Committee for the 
Environment, 1998) 
Marginal 
2000 28 Jul – First meeting between President Putin and leaders of largest Russian companies (Newsru.com, 
2001). 
Explicit 
2001 24 Jan – Second meeting between President Putin and leaders of largest Russian companies (Arutjunova and 
Bagrov, 2001; Putin, 2001).   
Explicit 
2002 31 Aug - Ecological Doctrine of Russian Federation (Ministry of the Natural Resources of RF, 2002; 
Mamedova, 2010; Socio-Ecological Union, 2001) 
Key Points of Russian Sustainable Development Strategy (Federal Council of RF, 2002) 
Marginal 
 
Marginal 
2003 15 Apr – All-Russia conference “Business Reputation and Social Responsibility of Business”. (Trade and 
Industry Chamber of RF, 2003a).  
16 Dec – First All-Russia congress on “The State and Socially Responsible business.” (Rybakova, 2003) 
23 Dec – President Putin meets with the Trade and Industry Chamber in a meeting titled “On the Social 
Explicit 
 
Explicit 
Explicit 
                                            
5 Presidential decrees are a commonly used policy instrument in the Russian Federation. The decrees are legally binding legislative acts that are secondary in power to the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Russian federal laws.   
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Responsibility of Business in Modern Russia” (Grigorjeva, 2003; Trade and Industry Chamber of RF, 
2003b).  
2004 26 May – President Putin delivers his “Message to the Federal Council of the Russian Federation” (Federal 
Council of RF, 2007) 
23 Jun - Second All-Russia congress on “The State and Socially Responsible business.” (Kondrashova, 2004; 
RBK, 2004). 
1 Jul – President Putin meets business leaders to discuss CSR (Open Economy, 2004; Samotorova, 2004; 
Sitnina and Grivach, 2004; Sitnina, 2004) 
16 Nov – XIV RUIE Summit (Frumkin, 2004; Grigorjeva, 2004; Putin, 2004; RUIE, 2004) 
Explicit 
 
Explicit 
 
Explicit 
 
Explicit 
2006 30 Mar – President Putin meets business leaders (Business Russia, 2006; Pchelkin, 2006). Explicit 
2007 15 Mar - Parliamentary hearings on “Corporate Social Responsibility in Russia: Aims, tasks, legislative 
provision” (Federal Council of RF, 2007). 
Explicit 
2008 2 June - Parliamentary hearings on “Corporate Social Responsibility and socio-economic development of 
Russia” (Federal Council of RF, 2008). 
17 Nov – Concept of Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation up to 2020, 
Directive of the Government of the Russian Federation №1662-р (Government of RF, 2008) 
Explicit 
 
Marginal 
2009 23 May - Parliamentary hearings on “Corporate Social Responsibility in the period of crisis: Challenges, 
experience, possibilities” (Federal Council of RF, 2009). 
17 Dec – The Climate Doctrine of Russian Federation (President of RF, 2009) 
Explicit 
 
Marginal 
2010 11 February – President Medvedev speaks at the 9th meeting of the Commission on Modernisation and 
Technological Development of Russian Economy (Medvedev, 2010) 
1 June – Prime Minister Putin meets with the Federation of Independent Trade Unions (New Politics, 2010).  
14 Oct – President Medvedev meets with the participants of the Third Summit of Social Teachers and Social 
Workers (Granik, 2010) 
Explicit 
 
Explicit 
Explicit 
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2011 21 Apr – Meeting between Prime Minister Putin and RUIE representative (CSR Journal, 2011) 
25 Apr – Action Plan for the Implementation of the Climate Doctrine (Government of RF, 2011) 
Explicit 
Marginal 
2012 9 Feb – XIX Summit of RUIE (Putin, 2012) Explicit 
 
Source: Authors 
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Figure 1: Russian government and business CSR discourse articulations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors, adapted from Walton and Boon (2014) 
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